Why do some dictators purge elites, while others do not? Further, what are the effects of purges for an autocrat’s prospects of political survival? The study of comparative autocracy has been dominated by the study of institutions, but the longstanding tool of purging remains central to the politics of contemporary autocracies. Edward Goldring argues that dictators purge elites to consolidate power, punish disloyalty, and alleviate popular threats by scapegoating elites. He also shows that these purges are largely effective: dictators can use purges of military elites to consolidate power and reduce the likelihood of facing a coup attempt, while scapegoating civilian elites can boost a dictator’s popularity among the people. Drawing on an original time-series dataset of civilian and military elite purges in 161 autocratic leadership spells across 82 countries, qualitative case studies of purges in North and South Korea, and experimental evidence from Turkey, this book illustrates how dictators use elite purges as they fight to survive.